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I. INTRODUCTION
When Henry Ford invented the automobile, it is unlikely that
he could have foreseen the changes his creation would bring to
the landscape of America. It is certainly unlikely that he antici-
pated what would become the bane of the urban dweller: find-
ing a parking space. As the twentieth century draws to a close,
this earthly annoyance has been transferred to outer space, as
countries and companies must now deal with the problem of
finding parking spaces for their telecommunications satellites.'
As a result, many fear that the present system of allocating orbits
and associated frequencies on the electromagnetic spectrum2
will price the acquisition costs of an orbital slot out of the range
of all but financial behemoths.3 At the same time, there is the
question of whether the practice of orbit "warehousing" and
leasing contravenes the principles which have developed to reg-
ulate the use of outer space in general, and the orbit/spectrum
resource in particular.4
A. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM
The nation of Tonga brought these concerns into focus in the
late eighties and early nineties when, working within the present
allocation framework, it applied for sixteen orbital slots, ulti-
I See generally Milton L. Smith, III, The Orbit/Spectrum Resource and the Technology
of Satellite Telecommunications: An Overview, 12 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
285 (1987); MichaelJ. Finch, Note, Limited Space: Allocating the Geostationaiy Orbit,
7 Nw.J. INr'L L. & Bus. 788 (1986).
2 The "orbit/spectrum resource" refers to the fact that satellites are assigned
both a space on the geostationary orbit and a frequency on the radio spectrum.
In addition to occupying a physical "slot," a satellite is also assigned a specific
frequency in order to avoid interference between transmissions. The dual nature
of the orbit/spectrum resource requires that both aspects be exploited simulta-
neously, and thus the current system to allocate orbits and frequencies necessar-
ily encompasses both aspects.
s Jonathan I. Ezor, Costs Overhead: Tonga's Claiming of Sixteen Geostationaiy Orbi-
tal Sites and the Implications for U.S. Space Policy, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 915, 934





mately acquiring six positions in 1991.1 Shortly thereafter, Ton-
gasat, a satellite company formed to handle Tonga's satellite,
proceeded to rent an allotment to Unicorn, a Colorado com-
pany.6 It then auctioned off its remaining slots for $2 million
per year for each orbit.7 Other global satellite operators such as
Intelsat and Panamsatjoined the fray. For example, the world's
largest satellite operating consortium, Intelsat,8 responded vehe-
mently, claiming that the move by Tongasat was tantamount to
"financial speculation in the geo-stationary orbit," in violation of
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Regula-
tions which govern satellite communications worldwide. 9 Co-
lumbia Communications then filed a petition with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) requesting that the FCC
deny applications for "landing rights" to any company using
Tonga's slots.10 Columbia excoriated Tonga's orbital wheeling
and dealing as "a transparent attempt to secure as many orbital
slots as possible to trade as a commodity for pecuniary gain."1"
As part of its accusations, Columbia claimed that Tonga was
violating a fundamental principle underlying the present regula-
tory structure in that "no entity or nation may lay claim to the
orbit/spectrum resource as a commodity that can be ware-
housed or traded."1 2 Nonetheless, Tonga admitted that its large
request exceeded their own requirements and "did not try to
5 Riddick, supra note 3, at 20.
6 Id. Tongasat is the Tonga Satellite Company, owned by Dr. Mats Nilson, an
American, and the King and Princess of Tonga. Id. at 20 n.71.
7 Id. at 21; see also Ezor, supra note 3, at 923.
8 Intelsat is a multi-national treaty organization with over 125 member coun-
tries. Although it is an international organization, "it behaves more like a pub-
lic/private company because it supplies international satellite
telecommunications on a commercial basis." JAN SMITS, LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLE-
MENTING INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 7 (1991). The group provides al-
most two-thirds of the worlds international telecommunication services. MILTON
L. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 29 (1990).
9 Intelsat Accuses Tongsat of Financial Speculation in Orbit, SATELLITE COMM., Oct.,
1990, at 8 [hereinafter Intelsat Accuses].
10 Columbia Asks FCC to Deny U.S. Markets to Users of Tonga's Orbital Slots, SATEL-
LITE WK., Aug. 30, 1993, available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 2612482 [hereinafter Co-
lumbia Asks FCC]. Landing rights refer to the authorization given by satellite
administrations such as the FCC which allow satellites within certain orbital loca-
tions to communicate with earth stations. Columbia asked that the FCC deny
such rights to any company using satellites in Tonga's orbital slot. Id.
II Id.
12 Rimsat Responds to Attacks on its Use of Tonga Orbit Slots, SATELLITE NEWS, Oct.
25, 1993, at 7 [hereinafter Rimsat Responds].
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hide its ongoing plan to lease, sell or otherwise barter away to
the highest bidder any rights it manage [d] to gain." 13
In response to Columbia's complaint, Rimsat Ltd., 4 which
had leased one of Tonga's slots, accused Intelsat and Columbia
of pursuing anti-competitive measures.1 5 Furthermore, Rimsat
asserted that once the ITU accepted Tonga's request, the issue
was closed.16 Rimsat further claimed that the U.S., in turn, is
"warehousing" satellite spectrum.1 7 Meanwhile, a confrontation
erupted between Tongasat and Indonesia when the latter trans-
ferred its Palapa BI satellite into a slot previously claimed by
Tongasat, further complicating the dispute.18 Tongasat, for its
part, insisted it had done nothing illegal. 9 It may be correct in
that it "apparently followed the correct procedures in publish-
ing and reserving the Pacific orbital locations."20
Procedural correctness notwithstanding, there remains the
question of whether Tonga's use of the orbit/spectrum alloca-
tion system to engage in warehousing and, arguably, specula-
tion, contravenes the purpose of the current rules pertaining to
orbit/spectrum allocation. Furthermore, orbit warehousing
may be antithetical to the tenets of space law, such as those em-
bodied in the Outer Space Treaty.21 Consequently, Columbia
insisted that the issue be raised at the 1995 World Radio Confer-
ence (WRC 1995).22 Intelsat asked the ITU to change the regu-
lations and deny Tonga access to the slots. 23 Australia, calling
for a review of the allotment procedures by outside experts,
voiced the fear that the acquisition of multiple slots by small
13 Columbia Asks FCC, supra note 10, at *2.
14 Rimsat is a satellite firm incorporated in Nevis and owned by citizens of the
united States. Lou Manuta, Orbital Contention: International Telecommunications
Union Assigns Orbital Slots Rules for Geosynchronous Satellites, SATELLITE COMM., Jan.
1994, at 32.
15 Rimsat Responds, supra note 12, at 7.
16 SATELLITE WK., Nov. 1, 1993, available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 2610094.
17 Manuta, supra note 14, at 32. Spectrum refers to the radio frequency por-
tion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Satellites must communicate with the
earth via this spectrum. Milton Smith, Space WARC 1985: The Quest for Equitable
Access, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229, 255 n.I1 (1985).
18 Special Report: Rising Powers in the Asia-Pacific, SATELLITE NEWS, Jan. 11, 1993,
available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 2609691.
19 Riddick, supra note 3, at 21. Nonetheless, Tonga did concede that its acts
"were most likely against the perceived agreement of the ITU." Id.
20 Ezor, supra note 3, at 936.
21 Id. at 928, 935; see also Riddick, supra note 3, at 21.




nations such as Tonga "would make it impossible for larger
economies to get enough Pacific Ocean slots."2 4 The United
States and other members of the ITU, however, rejected Austra-
lia's plan and the issue was not placed on the agenda for the
October WRC 1995.2
As a consequence of so many ITU members and current sys-
tem operators voicing such strenuous objections to Tonga's
warehousing and leasing practices, the ITU has approved a plan
whereby the ITU staff will review the procedures and report on
slot allocations to the recently concluded WRC 1995. A final
report will be presented at the 1997 conference, with the pur-
pose of "ensur[ing the] integrity of ITU procedures and equita-
ble access to orbital slots." 26 At the time of this writing, the
report is unavailable. Yet as recently as March of this year,
Tonga made the news again with plans to lease its remaining
two orbital positions. 7
It is possible that Tonga will not be the only party to engage in
the leasing of orbital "parking spaces." Therefore, this Com-
ment will analyze the existing regulatory regime governing or-
bit/spectrum allocation and discuss the legal implications of
orbital warehousing.
B. WHERE SATELLITES PARic THE ORBIT/SPECTRUM RESOURCE
The geostationary orbit is located approximately 35,786 kilo-
meters above the Earth's equator, with a radius of 42,164 kilo-
meters. 28 It is essentially a doughnut-shaped volume of space in
which geostationary satellites are placed.2 A geostationary satel-
lite placed in this orbit revolves at the same rate as the Earth,
essentially establishing a spot where the satellite appears motion-
less when viewed from Earth.30 As a result of this astronomical
sleight of hand, geostationary satellites can communicate with
approximately one third of the planet, an entire country, or if in
conjunction with a satellite network, the entire globe.31
24 ITU Likely to Review Satellite Slot Allocation Procedures Internally, SATELLITE WK.,
Oct. 17, 1994, available in Westlaw, 1994 WL 8733705.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 SATELLITE WK., Mar. 18, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 7054518.
28 Finch, supra note 1, at 789.
29 Martin A. Rothblatt, The Impact of International Satellite Communications Law
upon Access to the Geostationary Orbit and the Electromagnetic Spectrum, 16 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 207, 209 (1981).
30 Smith, supra note 1, at 286.
SI Id. at 287.
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The radio frequency portion of the orbit/spectrum resource
is a specified band on the electromagnetic spectrum, through
which satellites communicate with the earth.3 2 Although tech-
nology allows satellites to exploit most radio frequencies, some
frequencies are more useful than others.33 These aspects result
in certain physical limitations on the possible use of orbit and
spectrum. Therefore, the orbit/spectrum resource is consid-
ered to be finite.3 4 Due to the nature of both the geostationary
orbit and the radio frequency spectrum, the number of orbital
parking spaces is estimated at about 2000 satellites.3 5 This limi-
tation results from interference between satellite transmissions
due to either physical proximity or the use of one frequency by
multiple satellites in the same area.36 Despite the large size of
the geostationary orbit, at some point it will become difficult to
insert another satellite without significantly raising the risk of a
collision.37 Thus, the main consideration in allocating orbits
and spectrum is avoiding harmful interference between differ-
ent satellites and other users of the spectrum.3 8 This requires
that satellites be placed approximately eighteen kilometers
apart.3 9 So at some point, the orbit/spectrum resource will be-
come saturated.4 °
This problem is magnified in the wake of technological ad-
vances and the increased rate at which the advanced countries
32 Id. at 289.
33 Martin A. Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 56, 57 (1982). These are the C band, the Ku Band, and the Ka Band. Id.
Spectrum saturation is exacerbated by the fact that the C and K bands are the
most desirable due to their physical characteristics and economic considerations.
SMITH, supra note 8, at 12.
34 See generally Finch, supra note 1.
85 Id. at 789. The capacity of the spectrum is also limited due to the fact that
"technology has not yet advanced to the point where humanity can use the entire
radio spectrum." RITA L. WHITE & HAROLD M. WHITE, JR., THE LAW AND REGULA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COMMUNICATION 5 (1988).
36 E.D. DuCharme et al., The Genesis of the 1985/87 ITU World Administrative
Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space
Services Utilizing It, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 261, 263-64 (1982). Radio interfer-
ence occurs when two or more users operate on the same frequency simultane-
ously unless they are far enough apart or are configured so as not to interfere.
WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at 8.
37 Smith, supra note 1, at 288.
38 STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES AND POLICIES 36
(1991).
39 Finch, supra note 1, at 789.
40 Smith, supra note 1, at 288.
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are deploying satellites.4" On the other hand, due to advances
in different technologies, "the perception that the satellite orbi-
tal arc is diminishing may ultimately be proven false."42 Until
new technology alleviates the problem, however, "difficult allo-
cation choices... must be made to determine who may be eligi-
ble to utilize scarce orbital resources.
43
C. WHO GETS THE BEST SPOT?: BALANCING EQUITABLE ACCESS
AND EFFICIENT USE
As a consequence of the physical limitations just described,
there exists an ongoing tension between the goals of a fair and
equitable system of allocation and the efficient use of a finite
resource." As a result, the allocation system that has evolved
"emphasizes the requirements of those countries, or groups of
countries, which can establish the near term or present capabil-
ity to exploit orbit/spectrum resources. ''45 In fact, the original
system provided that equitable access would be granted to coun-
tries "according to their needs and the technical facilities at
their disposal."46 At the same time, article 33 of the ITU Con-
vention, which governs international satellite communications,
acknowledges that "radio frequencies and the geostationary sat-
ellite orbit are limited natural resources and that they must be
used efficiently and economically."47
The rationale underlying this approach was, because many
states have no need for a satellite system and the orbits to ac-
commodate them, giving orbit/spectrum assignments to nations
lacking satellite resources would "waste the orbit/spectrum re-
source and impair its overall efficient use."48
41 Thomas J. Cryan et al., Radio for the 1990's: Legal Strategies in an Emerging
Global Marketplace, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 377, 396 n.94 (1991).
42 Steven A. Levy, Institutional Perspectives on the Allocation of Space Orbital Re-
sources: The ITU, Common User Satellite Systems and Beyond, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 171, 175 (1984).
43 Id.
- See Martin A. Rothblatt, ITU Regulation of Satellite Communication, 19 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 7 (1982) ("The two basic principles which guide modern international
regulation of space telecommunications are efficient use and equitable sharing
of space service frequencies and the geostationary orbit.").
45 Levy, supra note 42, at 189.
46 International Telecommunications Convention, opened for signature Oct. 25,
1973, Malaga-Torremolinos, art. 33(2), 28 U.S.T. 2497 (hereinafter ITU
Convention].
47 Id. (emphasis added).
48 Smith, supra note 17, at 231 n.21.
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The existing system of allocation was a result of these ten-
sions between the efficient use of a finite resource and the dis-
pute between the technologically developed nations and those
less developed who feared a loss of access to the resource. Yet
ironically, the current system is the framework in which Tonga
acquired six orbital slots, despite the fact it had no indigenous
satellite capability. 49 In order to understand the nature of the
system presently in use, a knowledge of the regulatory structure
and the development of the current allocation process is in
order.
II. THE SATELLITE PARKING PATROL: THE
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
International satellite telecommunications and the issue of or-
bit/spectrum allocation are generally governed by the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized U.N.
body.5" The ITU, founded in 1865, is one of the oldest interna-
tional communications organizations.51 It seeks to encourage
cooperation among its members in order to improve telecom-
munications of all kinds and to offer technical assistance to de-
veloping countries.5 The ITU, however, is not a supranational
regulatory regime and lacks a permanent charter.53 The ITU is
essentially a technical, rather than legislative, body, yet it has
nonetheless become "a major forum for the development of in-
ternational space law."5 4 Still, the ITU has recently reconsid-
ered its role in international telecommunications and its new
agenda includes transforming itself into a true intergovernmen-
tal organization.5 5
49 Ezor, supra note 3, at 922.
50 See generally CARL Q CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 547-604 (1982); SMITH, supra note 8, at 23-44. For a detailed description of
the structure and functions of the ITU, see DAVID M. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPEC-
TRUM 12 (1970). For a comprehensive history of the ITU, see WHITE & WHITE,
supra note 35.
51 Cryan et al., supra note 41, at 397.
52 Brian E. Harris, New Developments: The New Telecommunications Development:
Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union, 7 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 83,
83-84 (1991).
53 Levy, supra note 42, at 186.
54 Riddick, supra note 3, at 18.
55 Cryan et al., supra note 41, at 398.
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A. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ITU
The regulatory regime of the ITU is defined by the ITU Con-
vention and the Radio Regulations.56 The Convention, entered
into in 1973, serves as the "constitution" of the ITU, 7 while the
Radio Regulations address detailed technical issues. 58 Both the
Convention and the Radio Regulations have the force of inter-
national treaties. 59 At the same time, however, countries may
make reservations or declarations pertaining to aspects of ITU
agreements or proceedings, thus preserving national sovereignty
while creating "convenient escape clauses."6 °
In addition to the Convention and the Radio Regulations, the
various bodies of the ITU make resolutions and recommenda-
tions to its members. Although not binding, the resolutions and
recommendations are almost universally complied with in prac-
tice.61 The Plenipotentiary Conference has been called the
"supreme organ" of the ITU.62 This conference serves as the
political arm of the ITU and is the only ITU body with the
power to revise the ITU Convention. 63
The Radio Regulations are revised at the Administrative Radio
Conferences held at both the regional and global level. The
global conferences are called "World Administrative Radio Con-
ferences" or WARCs. 64 Article 7 of the ITU Convention gives
the conferences the power to decide on partial or complete revi-
sion of the Regulations, as well as other questions within the
competence of the conferences.65
56 LEIVE, supra note 50, at 12.
57 The Convention "gives the ITU its legal existence, establishes its composi-
tion, purposes, structure, functions, general provisions relating to telecommuni-
cation and specific provisions related to radio communication." WHITE & WHITE,
supra note 35, at 69.
58 The Radio Regulations "define the conditions for a harmonious use of the
radio spectrum by all countries in order to prevent chaos." SMITS, supra note 8, at
77-78.
59 CHRISTOL, supra note 50, at 548.
60 Harris, supra note 52, at 85. This preservation of sovereignty acknowledges
that countries have the right to regulate their own telecommunications environ-
ment. WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at 78.
61 Rothblatt, supra note 29, at 213. Furthermore, "the member states unani-
mously obey the regulations because they recognize the necessity for all national
networks to be interconnectable and interoperable." Harris, supra note 52, at 86.
62 CHRISTOL, supra note 50, at 548.
63 SMITH, supra note 8, at 24.
64 SMITS, supra note 8, at 44.
65 Id.
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The main function of the WARCs is to allocate spectrum and
orbits. 66 According to one expert, "the primary purpose of the
Conference is to devise an international regulatory regime for
the equitable sharing and efficient use of the radio spectrum
and the geostationary satellite orbit."67 The results of these con-
ferences, termed the "Final Acts," are then incorporated into
the Radio Regulations. Once approved by the member coun-
tries, the revisions also have the legal status of international
treaties.68
B. THE GoALs AND PURPOSES OF THE ITU
The preamble to the 1973 Convention states that the underly-
ing purpose of the ITU is to facilitate "peaceful relations, inter-
national cooperation and economic and social development
among peoples by means of efficient telecommunication serv-
ices. "69 Steps for achieving this purpose are embodied in article
4 of the 1973 Convention: 70
a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the im-
provement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds;
b) to promote the development of technical facilities and their
most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of
telecommunication... [and] c) to harmonize the actions of na-
tions in the attainment of those ends.71
To achieve these goals, the ITU has a mandate to: "effect allo-
cation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio
frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference
between radio stations of different countries; [and] b) coordi-
nate efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio sta-
tions of different countries and to improve the use made of the
radio frequency spectrum."72
66 CHRISTOL, supra note 50, at 549; see also SMITH, supra note 8, at 25.
67 Ram S. Jakhu, The Evolution of the ITU's Regulatory Regime Governing Space
Radiocommunication Services and the Geostationary Satellite Orbit, 8 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 381 (1983).
68 Martin L. Stem, Communication Satellites and the Geostationary Orbit: Reconciling
Equitable Access With Efficient Use, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 859, 864 (1982).
69 ITU Convention, supra note 46, pmbl. (emphasis added).
70 Id. art. 4.
71 Id. (emphasis added).
72 Id. The ITU also specifies that it shall:
c) coordinate efforts with a view to harmonizing the development
of telecommunications facilities ... d) foster collaboration among
its Members with a view to the establishment of rates at levels as low
as possible consistent with an efficient service . .. [and] e) foster
288
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Article 33 of the 1973 Convention also deals with problems of
interference, equitable access, and efficiency:
Members shall endeavor to limit the number of frequencies
and the spectrum space used to the minimum essential to pro-
vide in satisfactory manner the necessary services. To that end
they shall endeavor to apply the latest technical advances as soon as
possible.
In using frequency bands for space radio services Members
shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary
satellite orbit are limited natural resources, that they must be used
efficiently and economically so that countries or groups of coun-
tries may have equitable access to both in conformity with the provi-
sions of the Radio Regulations according to their needs and the
technical facilities at their disposal.73
The language of article 33 implied that countries without a
need for the orbit/spectrum resource or the means to utilize it
would not be given access.7 1 Article 33, however, as amended in
1982 at the Plenipotentiary Conference in Nairobi, now requires
that the ITU take into account "the special needs of developing
countries and the geographical situation of particular coun-
tries." 75 Nonetheless, the language of the Convention shows
that the primary considerations underlying the governing of in-
ternational satellite communications are those of equitable ac-
cess and the efficient use of a limited resource.
C. THE RCS: THE INTERNATIONAL METER MAID 76
The task of interpreting, administering, and enforcing the
policies and agreements of the ITU rests with the Radiocom-
munications Service (RCS). The RCS allocates frequencies and
orbital slots based on the decisions made at the WARCs. 77 It
oversees coordination of the use of spectrum and assists in
resolving conflicts when there are competing claims for an orbi-
tal position and spectrum (such as that between Tongasat and
the creation, development and improvement of telecommunica-
tion equipment and networks in developing countries by every
means at its disposal.
Id.
73 Id. art. 33 (emphasis added).
74 Smith, supra note 17, at 238.
75 Id. at 240.
76 The Radiocommunications Service was formerly called the International
Frequency Registration Bureau (IFRB). The name changed during a re-vamping
of the structure of the ITU in 1993. Manuta, supra note 14, at 32.
77 CHRISTOL, supra note 50, at 549.
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Indonesia) or when issues of interference arise. The RCS is also
charged with recording the assigned frequencies and orbital po-
sitions in a Master Register.78
Unfortunately, the RCS has no real enforcement power and
cannot exercise any real control over how a member state uses
its orbit/spectrum assignment.79  One commentator has
pointed out that "if the [RCS] Board can be compared to a traf-
fic officer, it is an officer unable to adequately measure the traf-
fic, whose 'tickets' for violations are often ignored and who lacks
not only ajail but also a court for offenders."80 Yet despite this
lack of enforcement power, member states generally observe the
ITU Convention and Radio Regulations "because it is in their
best interests to do so."81 With this background information in
hand, a discussion of the present system of allocation is in order.
III. ASSIGNING THE PARKING SPACES: DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ALLOCATION SYSTEM
A. EARLY FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM
The regulations and procedures governing the use of tele-
communications satellites in space were initially based on the
system established to regulate radio stations which dates back to
1927.82 At that time, the primary concern was harmful interfer-
ence in terms of frequency allocation. The registration system
protected stations which were already operating from infringe-
ment by later users. This a posteriori method utilizing notifica-
tion and registration of frequency assignments is essentially a
"first-come, first-served" process.8 An a posteriori approach en-
tails the granting of rights as a specific need arises. An a priori
approach grants future rights to each nation "on the basis of
agreed principles." 84
Ultimately, the a posteriori approach was extended to space
communications as well when the procedure was applied to the
78 SMITS, supra note 8, at 69.
79 Levy, supra note 42, at 186.
80 LEIVE, supra note 50, at 22 n.8. "The Board cannot order stations off the air
and cannot even refuse to record frequency assignments in the Master Register."
Id. at 24.
81 Id.
82 SMITH, supra note 8, at 57.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 65.
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allocation of frequencies for space services." At first, the system
seemed adequate to the task given the moderate use of the or-
bit/spectrum resource and a perception of the resource as be-
ing unlimited.86  The rapid development of satellite
communications, however, eventually led to an increased de-
mand for the orbit/spectrum resource, and a growing percep-
tion of its scarcity created pressures on the system and concerns
on the part of developing countries.8 7 These countries feared
that the "first-come, first-served" process would result in a situa-
tion where the advanced countries could ultimately monopolize
the available frequencies. 88 Furthermore, since it is widely ac-
knowledged that "[a] well-developed communications infra-
structure is essential to a modern economy,"8 9 the concerns of
the developing nations were well founded. These growing con-
cerns set the stage for the development of the present allocation
system.
B. SHARING THE PARKING LOT: EARCs, WARCs, AND
EQUITABLE ACCESS
Whereas the developed countries wished to apply the first-
come, first-served approach to the new realm of satellite tele-
communications, the developing countries feared that such an
approach would penalize their lack of technology and they
would be denied access to the resource. 90 Developed countries
generally prefer the first-come, first-served a posteriori approach
because it provides for efficient access while not allowing seg-
ments of the resource to be left unused.91 Developing nations,
on the other hand, prefer an a piori approach in which frequen-
85Jakhu, supra note 67, at 381-82. The 1959 WARC resulted in few changes to
the Regulations. The establishment of a "space service," however, required that
frequencies be allocated for space research purposes. See SMITH, supra note 8, at
59. With the rapid rise in the use of satellites following the launch of Sputnik, a
1963 WARC was planned to address further allocations of frequency, depending
on technological developments. Id.
86 Levy, supra note 42, at 173.
87 Id. at 171.
88 SMITH, supra note 8, at 59. Although the conflict is sometimes characterized
as a north-south division or technological "haves" against the technological "have
nots," one commentator points out that the scarcity of orbit locations and their
associated frequencies "creates dilemmas that are common to virtually all satel-
lite-using nations." Levy, supra note 42, at 172.
89 Harris, supra note 52, at 92.
90 SMITH, supra note 8, at 59-60, 71 n.21.
91 DuCharme et al., supra note 36, at 261 n.1.
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cies and orbits are pre-coordinated, such as the plans regulating
certain frequency bands used in maritime transmissions.92
The 1963 Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference
(EARC) squarely addressed the concerns of the developing na-
tions. The conference included a debate on U.N. General As-
sembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), which stated that
"communication by means of satellites should be available to the
nations of the world.., on a global and non-discriminatory ba-
sis." " Despite these proclaimed goals, the developed countries
prevailed and the a posteriori system was adopted for space tele-
communications.94 Consequently, some developing countries
"expressed fears that the radio spectrum would be preempted
by the developed countries if the practice of first-come, first-
served continued."95 The quest for equitable access was on.
The 1971 WARC resulted in few changes to the regulatory
scheme.96 Still, the principle of equitable access appeared yet
again in Resolution Spa 2-1. The resolution considered that "all
countries have equal rights in the use of both the radio frequen-
cies.., and the geostationary satellite orbit."97 The Resolution,
while "taking into account" that the orbit/spectrum resources
are "limited" and "should be most effectively and economically
used," concluded that the system of regulation "should not pro-
vide any permanent priority for any individual country... and
should not create an obstacle to the establishment of space sys-
tems by other countries." 98 Nonetheless, the first-come, first-
served approach was retained yet again.99
It should be noted that the allocation of frequencies had pre-
viously been for "fixed satellite services." The 1971 Conference,
however, prepared the way for defining a new radio service, the
Broadcasting-Satellite Service.100 This would include allocating
92 Id.
93 G.A. Res. 1721, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/
5100 (1962).
94 SMITH, supra note 8, at 60. For a detailed discussion of the revisions made at
the 1963 Conference, see LEIVE, supra note 50, at 215-28.
95 Jakhu, supra note 67, at 400.
96 DuCharme et al., supra note 36, at 266.
97 Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunica-
tions, ITU Res. No. Spa 2-1 (1971), reprinted in 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. 7435.
98 Id.
99 Jakhu, supra note 67, at 404; see also WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at 140-
44.
100 Rothblatt, supra note 44, at 9. A discussion of the aspects of fixed satellite
services and broadcast services is beyond the scope of this Comment, but see id.
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frequencies on a worldwide basis, which would require the plan-
ning of orbits and spectrum for these services as part of a com-
prehensive plan. 10 1 Significantly, "[t]his was the first attempt to
prepare an a priori plan for space service. 1 2 The 1973 Plenipo-
tentiary Conference was notable for the adoption of portions of
Resolution Spa 2-2, which was partially incorporated into article
33. In essence, the concept of equitable access to the orbit/
spectrum resource became part of a legally binding treaty.1 0 3
By the end of the 1970s, a number of principles had been
incorporated into the ITU regime: equitable access to and effi-
cient and economical use of the orbit/spectrum resource; ac-
knowledgement that the resource is limited; and the concept of
resource sharing, with no permanent priority given to any na-
tion.10 4 The net result, at least for a few frequencies and orbital
positions, was the genesis of an a priori system of allocation.
C. RESERVED PARKING: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1980s
AND 1990s
The 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference held in Nairobi contin-
ued the trend toward accommodating the needs of the develop-
ing nations. The 1973 ITU Convention was revised at the
Conference. A revision to article 33 of the ITU Convention was
of particular importance.1 0 5 As discussed previously, article 33
of the 1973 Convention specified that equitable access was to be
assured "according to [the] needs and technical facilities at
[the] disposal" of the developing nations. 10 6 The Nairobi Con-
ference modified the phrase, replacing it with "taking into ac-
("The distinguishing feature of the 'broadcast satellite service' is a unidirectional
flow of signals to the general public . . . whereas the key feature of the 'fixed
satellite service' is a bi-or multi-directional flow of signals, i.e., a flow of signals
among earth stations." Id. at 9 n.39; see also WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at
140-44).
101 Rothblatt, supra note 44, at 9.
102 DuCharme et al., supra note 36, at 267. According to Martin Rothblatt:
"[T] he principles of efficient and equitable use of space service frequencies and
orbital positions were interpreted to mean, at least for 12 Ghz band broadcasting-
satellite service, a priori assignment of the orbit/spectrum resource." Rothblatt,
supra note 44, at 10.
103 SMrrH, supra note 8, at 62.
104 GOROVE, supra note 38, at 571.
105 For a detailed discussion of the revisions made by the Nairobi Convention,
see generally Samuel E. Probst, The Plenipotentiary Conference of the International
Telecommunication Union, Nairobi, 1982: A summary of Results, 77 AM. Soc'v INT'L L.
PRoc. 354 (1983).
106 ITU Convention, supra note 46, art. 33.
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count the special needs of the developing countries and the
geographical situation of particular countries. 1 0 7
This language reflected the concern of the developing na-
tions that their future access to the orbit/spectrum resource
should not be hindered by their stage of technological develop-
ment.10 8 The change to article 33 was significant in its implica-
tions because "[b]y emphasizing the special needs of the
developing countries ...Article 33 require[s] that equity be
measured not simply in terms of efficiency and economy."109
Other relevant factors to be considered in resource allocation,
and which now factor into the allotment of orbital positions and
spectrum, include: the geographical location of particular coun-
tries which affect the use of the resource, the technological abil-
ity to use the resource, and the needs of existing users. 1 ' The
net result is that allocations are now determined by balancing all
of these factors which, from the standpoint of the developing
countries, is more equitable. The process, however, could lead
to a less efficient and economical use of the orbit/spectrum
resource. I I I
The final evolution of the current allotment system took place
in the 1985 and 1988 Sessions of what is known as the "Space
WARC." 1 2 The prime objective of the conference was to guar-
antee equitable access to both the geostationary orbit and the
radio frequency spectrum for the purposes of space services.1 1 3
107 International Telecommunication Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, Nairobi, art.
33, reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENTS (Gerd D.
Wallenstein, ed. (1982)) [hereinafter Nairobi Convention].
108 WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at 188.
109 Id. at 189. "While the principles of efficiency and economy are still re-
tained, and are important to the general principle of equitable access, those con-
siderations now must be viewed in light of the explicit recognition that equity
specifically requires . consideration of the special needs of the developing
countries." Id.
110 Smith, supra note 17, at 246-47.
111 Id. at 242. The approach adopted in Nairobi may not be the most efficient
use of the resource because the older and less expensive technology employed by
developing countries use more of the resource than the latest technology utilized
in the more technologically advanced nations. WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at
189.
112 Space WARC was conducted in two sessions, one in 1985 and one in 1988.
The present system of orbit/spectrum allocation developed as a result of both
sessions. For purposes of brevity, the results of both Conferences will be referred
to singly in terms of the final product.
1s Remarks by Milton Smith, Developments in the International Law of Telecommu-
nications: Strategic Issues for Global Telecommunications Markets, 83 AM. Soc'v INT'L L.
PROC. 385, 387 (1989).
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It's focus was on planning issues for the fixed satellite services
only. " 4 As usual, the debate over the a priori systems favored by
the developing nations and the a posteriori system favored by the
technologically advanced countries colored the proceedings.
1 1 5
Ultimately, the conference reached a compromise which for-
mulated a dual system of allocation. 11 6 The allotment proce-
dures apply only to the fixed satellite services (FSS), and within
that service, only the so-called "expansion" bands of the spec-
trum are planned. 1 7 The conventional bands, those used by
most telecommunications satellites, remained unplanned."1 8 In
essence then, the majority of the orbit/spectrum resource re-
mains accessible on the first-come, first-served basis.' 9 As a re-
sult, "the practice of 'first-come, first-served' which the
developing countries want to discontinue still governs the major
portion of the radio spectrum."1 20 The a priori system adopted
to regulate the orbit/spectrum resource for the purposes of the
fixed satellite services represents only one percent of the total
spectrum allocated to space services. 121 Because the unplanned
bands remain subject to the first-come, first-served approach,
"some may assert that its worst attributes were preserved. 1 22
The allotment plan also dealt with orbital positions, with each
nation being entitled to a "pre-determined arc" (PDA), along
with a radio frequency.1 23 Although guaranteeing access to the
orbit/spectrum resource in theory, the allotment of the majority
114 WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at 206.
115 Id.
116 The allotment system that resulted from Space WARC is the system cur-
rently in use.
117 Smith, supra note 113, at 387. The expansion bands are those allocated at
the 1979 WARC to allow for technological development. These bands were not
yet in use by the developed countries. Id.
118 Essentially, the regulatory regime for these unplanned bands is the previ-
ously-established procedure of advance publication, coordination, notification,
and registration, discussed further in part IV, infra. SMITH, supra note 8, at 157.
119 Remarks by Ram Jakhu, Developments in the International Law of Telecommuni-
cations: Strategic Issues for a Global Telecommunication Market, 83 Am. Soc'v INT'L L.
PROC. 385, 391 (1989).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Milton Smith, A New Era for the International Regulation of Satellite Communica-
tions, 14 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 449, 454 (1989).
123 See SMITH, supra note 8, at 129; WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at 206-07.
The allotment system for the FSS bands guarantees each nation at least one orbi-
tal position with a predetermined arch and a frequency bandwidth of at least 800
Mhz. Id.
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of the orbit/spectrum resource retains an a posteriori aspect.124
Since the plan "specifies only a nominal position in a predeter-
mined arc of the orbit... [and] an orbital position of a country
can be moved within that arc without that country's consent...
[t]his may create serious difficulties, especially for the late-
comer countries because the rule of 'first come, first served' ap-
plies to the actual occupation of the orbital positions within that
predetermined arc."1 25 Consequently, technologically devel-
oped countries are favored under the system.
The 1992 WARC addressed the allocation of frequency to sat-
ellite systems which do not operate in the geostationary orbit,
but rather at a lower height, thus they are named Low Earth
Orbit satellites or "LEOs. '' 126 LEOs are designated as Large
LEOs and Small LEOs based on their respective technological
capabilities. 127 A discussion of LEO technology is beyond the
scope of this Comment. However, the mobile technology served
by the LEOs benefits the lesser developed countries by provid-
ing communications in areas unserved by the existing telecom-
munications infrastructure. 128
The WRC 1995 continued the work begun at the 1992 WARC
pertaining to allocation for LEOs. Initially, there was a conflict
between the United States and the European contingent over
the focus of the conference. 129 The United States's primary con-
sideration was the allocation of further spectrum for both the
LEO MSS systems and the non-geostationary fixed satellite sys-
tems. 130 The European contingent, on the other hand, wished
to focus on the adoption of a report by the Voluntary Group of
Experts (VGE) designed to simplify the ITU radio regula-
tions.13 1 In fact, a resolution adopted at the 14th plenary meet-
ing specified as its first agenda item a "review of the final report
of the VGE, and to consider related proposals from administra-
124 Jakhu, supra note 119, at 391.
125 Id.
126 Regina La Croix, Developments in International Satellite Communications in the
International Space Year, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 99, 104 (1993).
127 Id.
128 Leslie Taylor, The Great Spectrum Squeeze of 1992, TELEPHONY, Mar. 11, 1991,
at 19. The projected market for LEO systems may exceed $20 billion by the year
2000. Trade Association Exec is Likely to Head U.S. WRC '95 Delegation, SATELLITE
NEWS, Sept. 11, 1995, available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 5914772.
129 With WRC 95 Success in Hand, U.S. to Begin Preparation for WRC 97, CoMM.
DAILY, Dec. 4, 1995, at 5 [hereinafter WRC 95 Success].
1s0 A non-geostationary system functions outside the geostationary orbit.
131 U.S. Government and Industry, TELEVISION DIG., Oct. 2, 1995, at 5.
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tions, in order to undertake, as appropriate, a revision of the
Radio Regulations." 132
The issues and concerns raised by Tonga's actions, however,
were still not addressed at the 1995 conference. Yet despite the
shortcomings of the allocation system, at least as perceived by
the developing countries, Tonga ironically has used the system
to its advantage in acquiring its orbital positions.l 33 Thus, de-
spite decades of political wrangling and the subsequent a priori
planning of certain bands, in the end, it was a developing coun-
try that utilized the system in a manner which now has some
experts analyzing certain aspects of the first-come, first-served
approach.
Given the negative responses to Tonga's actions and the fact
that Tonga used the existing procedures to acquire the excess
orbital capacity, the questions of whether such behavior violates
the ITU Convention and whether the present system is in need
of revision should be asked. It is "apparently uncontested that
Tonga properly followed the publishing procedure mandated
by the ITU."1 34 Consequently, "[wihen a small player like the
Kingdom of Tonga... can upset the relative peace while techni-
cally adhering to [the] rules, it is proper to consider whether it
is the rule or the attitudes which need to be altered.""3 5
IV. ASSIGNING THE PARKING SPACES: THE CURRENT
METHOD OF ORBIT/SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
The acquisition of orbital positions and the associated spec-
trum is governed by two separate procedures. As already dis-
cussed, the Space WARC devised an allotment plan for certain
bands required for fixed satellite services, while all other bands
remain governed by what essentially is the original a posteriori
approach. Since Tonga applied for a position within these un-
planned bands, it is the a posteriori portion of the system that is
under scrutiny. 136 The procedure involves three stages: ad-
vance publication, coordination, and notification.
132 ITU Res. No. 1065, Doc. No. C94/149-E (1995) (as adopted at the Four-
teenth Plenary Meeting), available on Internet at http://www.fcc.gov. Other doc-
uments available at this Internet address include all final reports of the FCC's six
informal working groups (IWGs), as well as the U.S. Proposals for the WRC.
133 Manuta, supra note 14, at 33.
134 Ezor, supra note 3, at 933.
1' Manuta, supra note 14, at 32.
136 Tonga requested 16 positions in the C-band, which, along with the Ku
band, remains "unplanned." Id. A detailed discussion of the allotment system
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The first step in acquiring an orbit entails the advance publi-
cation of technical information regarding the characteristics of
the system a satellite operator wishes to license. 137 The informa-
tion must be submitted to the RCS as early as nine years, but no
later than two years, prior to the beginning of the satellite ser-
vice. 13 The RCS then publishes the information in its weekly
bulletin.19 The publication process allows other system opera-
tors to determine whether there is a danger of interference with
a system already in operation. 40 If an administration deter-
mines that a proposed system might cause harmful interference,
it has four months to communicate with the administrator of
the proposed system as to the nature of the interference.' Dis-
putes over potential interference are governed by the Radio
Regulations. 14 2 Any difficulties may be handled bilaterally or
multilaterally, but the RCS may help with the process if neces-
sary. 143 This process of coordination with potentially affected
satellite systems administrators is not required when no interfer-
ence is anticipated.1"
Once the coordination process is completed and problems of
interference are solved, the nation or company proposing the
new system then notifies the RCS which, provided it finds no
technical hindrances, will register the orbit/frequency assign-
ment in the Master Register. 4 5 If the publication and coordina-
tion processes are not completed within nine years, the
information published by the RCS will be cancelled if the satel-
lite has not been put into operation.146 Once properly regis-
tered, however, the assignment is entitled to international
recognition and protection against harmful interference for the
duration of its operation.'47
for the planned bands is beyond the scope of this Comment, but see generally,
SMITH, supra note 8, at 162-74; WHITE & WHITE, supra note 35, at 207-09.
137 Manuta, supra note 14, at 32.
138 SMITH, supra note 8, at 157-58.
139 SMITS, supra note 8, at 83.
140 Id.




145 SMITS, supra note 8, at 83.
146 SMITH, supra note 8, at 158.
147 Manuta, supra note 14, at 33.
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V. PARKING VIOLATIONS: DOES ORBITAL
WAREHOUSING VIOLATE THE LETTER OR SPIRIT OF
THE ITU CONVENTION?
Two problems arise under the current scheme, both under
the a priori approach to the planned bands and the a posteriori
assignment of the rest of the orbit/spectrum resource. First,
under the a priori portion of the regime, there is no require-
ment that a potential user demonstrate need or the technical
capability to use an assignment. 48 Consequently, Tonga, with
no satellite capability of its own, was able to lock up multiple
orbital slots by following the present ITU procedures.
The second problem pertains to the a posteriori portion of the
regime. In the absence of any true enforcement power, the ITU
cannot prevent a satellite administration or nation from launch-
ing into a pre-registered slot. Uncoordinated use of the orbit/
spectrum resource is an increasing problem. 14 9 Satellites are be-
ing launched without coordination and although the ITU
presumes nations will follow the coordination procedure, "bilat-
eral negotiations between administrations can be very difficult
when faced with such fait accompli situations."150 In addition,
the problem of balancing equitable access and efficiency is also
exacerbated by the fact that "considerations of economy or effi-
ciency are not necessarily compatible with the factor of
equity. 1 5
1
Although Tonga apparently did not breach the regulations, it
can be argued that Tonga and the practice of orbit/spectrum
warehousing violates the ITU in spirit, if not in practice. Ware-
housing, leasing, or auctioning of the orbit/spectrum resource,
whether it involves FSS "planned" bands or other parts of the
orbit/spectrum resource, very possibly conflicts with the con-
cepts of equitable access and efficiency. In fact, Robert Jones,
the head of the RCS, recently stated that "[t] he single most im-
portant issue [for the ITU] is the reservation of capacity without
actual use.... Some administrations tend to initiate the coordi-
148 Carl Q. Christol, The Legal Status of the Geostationary Orbit in the Light of the
1985-1988 Activities of the IT, 32 COLLOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE 215 (1989).
The current allotment plan "does not require a country to be able to use or
exploit the indicated resource at any given time." Id. at 215.
149 TU Tries to Solve New Problems Without Interfering with National Sovereignty,
SATELLITE W., May 29, 1995, available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 5915544 [hereinafter
ITU Tries to Solve].
150 Id.
151 Christol, supra note 148, at 216.
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nation procedure for more orbital positions or for more spec-
trum than needed."1 52  Furthermore, many states have no
foreseeable need for a satellite system. Giving them exclusive
rights to orbital/frequency allotments "would retard technologi-
cal advancement and waste unused portions of the orbit/spec-
trum resource."153
Furthermore, "access" in terms of equitable access presup-
poses reaching the geostationary orbit, which thus requires
space launch capability.1 4 In addition, even for a nation with
satellite technology, the term "access" does not grant ownership.
One author has pointed out that "[a]ccess clearly does not im-
ply ownership of a position or segment of the orbit, but only
admittance to it."1 55
Despite the requirement in article 33 that consideration of
the special needs of the developing countries enter the alloca-
tion equation, this does not mean that developing countries are
entitled to any priority in the allocation process. 15 6 It does
mean, however, that the needs of the developing countries
"must be considered on the same basis as the uses made by de-
veloped countries notwithstanding the fact that less efficient
and economical uses of the resource may result."1 57 In balanc-
ing equitable access, efficiency, and the needs of the developing
countries, it is "clear that the general needs of a small-size coun-
try with a few thousand inhabitants cannot be equated with
those of a large-size country with millions of inhabitants." 58
Consequently, the acquisition of six orbital positions by the
tiny country of Tonga, a nation with no indigenous satellite ca-
pability, is antithetical to the true meaning and purpose of the
wording of the ITU Convention and the principles of equitable
access and efficiency. Furthermore, the warehousing and leas-
152 Id.
153 Smith, supra note 17, at 236.
154 GoRovE, supra note 38, at 59.
155 Id.
156 Smith, supra note 17, at 241. Article 33 can be interpreted "to exclude
countries without a present need and ability to use the orbit/spectrum resource
from present considerations of equitable access." Id. at 237.
157 Id. at 241. Nonetheless, current users of the resource should be entitled to
consideration in the process of allocation as they undertook to utilize the re-
source at exorbitant cost and in reliance on the protection of the regulatory re-
gime. Id. at 245. Milton Smith adds that "[t]he notions of fairness inherent in
the concept of equity require that those users be accommodated." Id.
158 Stephen Gorove, Principles of Equity in International Space Law, 26 COLLO-
QUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE 17, 18 (1983).
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ing of the orbit/spectrum resource to the highest bidder favors
the technologically advanced, wealthy countries (or consorti-
ums), thus undercutting both goals of equitable access and effi-
ciency. The auctioning or leasing of orbits and spectrum "could
lead to an industry in which only wealthy players could afford to
pay the auction price for licenses."159
This type of market-based behavior makes the allocation of
orbital sites more costly because the cost of the lease is in addi-
tion to the costs under the standard approach to orbit/spec-
trum acquisition:
The ultimate users, nations who were able to take advantage of
the sites and place satellites in orbit, might well be the same
countries that would have gained access to the orbits without cost
under the [RCS] publication. Satellites in these sites, owing to
their higher initial cost, would probably be more costly to utilize
as well. Ironically, allowing unlimited access by the less-devel-
oped countries to the geostationary orbit along the lines of what
Tonga has claimed could mean that their telecommunications
might cost more than they would otherwise.16
In responding to Tonga's acquisition of six positions, Panam-
sat, a global satellite operator, pointed out that Tonga's action
will ultimately harm both the developed and developing na-
tions: "Lesser developed countries could be hurt ... because
Tonga is trying to comer the market on slots in order to de-
159 Cryan et al., supra note 41, at 403. A market system would "inhibit ...
distribution by allocating geostationary [positions and spectrum] in accordance
with demand or value measures that are simple functions of national wealth."
Rothblatt, supra note 29, at 235-36.
160 Ezor, supra note 3, at 935. Some commentators take the position that such
a process would actually be more efficient. A discussion of the economic aspects
of an auction process is beyond the scope of this Comment, but see generally
Clas G. Wihlborg & Per M. Wijkman, Outer Space Resources in Efficient and Equitable
Use: New Frontiers for Old Principles, 1981 J.L. & ECON. 24 (1981); see also, Michael
S. Straubel, Telecommunication Satellites & Market Forces: How Should the Geostation-
aiy Orbit be Regulated by the F.C.C.?, 17 N.C. J. INr'L & CoM. REG. 205, 235
(1992) ("Such an auction system would stimulate technological development.
Under the system, satellite operators would feel the pressures of the market to
become more competitive. Technological advances make an operator more
competitive."). The FCC recently received approval from Congress to auction
domestic spectrum. Senate Approves Auction Proposal for DBS Frequencies at 110 De-
grees, SATELLITE NEWS, Oct. 2, 1995, available inWestlaw, 1995 WL 10253925. The
successful functioning of an auction system within the United States could gener-
ate further interest in utilizing the same process at the international level.
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mand payments from those seeking to use the orbital arc." 16 1
Such actions could raise costs for both developed and develop-
ing countries. Entrepreneurship and new technologies could
also be stymied by the current process if leasing and auctioning
is allowed. Many sectors of the satellite industry fear that auc-
tions would require paying "huge sums for the valuable spec-
trum [which] could lock out future potential industry
innovators who are cash-poor, and serve as a barrier to entry to
many (as yet) untapped markets."162
Another problem, related to efficiency, is that allotted spec-
trum may also simply sit idle as nations either lack the ability to
use the resource or speculate on market forces, thus truly wast-
ing a valuable resource. In fact, "the allotment plan, while
granting a spot to every nation on Earth, does not require any of
the nations to use them."163 It can be argued that indeterminate
protection provided for registered slots in the unplanned bands
is antithetical to the concept of efficient use of the orbit/spec-
trum resource because "[r]ecent experience indicates that un-
realistically long operational lifetimes are notified [to the RCS],
leading to almost permanent occupation of orbital positions."1 64
VI. CAN ANYONE OWN THE PARKING LOT?: THE
OUTER SPACE TREATY AND THE COMMON HERITAGE
OF MANKIND
In addition to the possibility of violations in spirit, if not the
letter, of the ITU, the practice of warehousing and leasing posi-
tions may also run counter to general principles of space law as
embodied in other treaties, and to international legal principles
relating to outer space in general. Of particular relevance are
the principles underlying the Outer Space Treaty and the gen-
eral principle known as "the common heritage of mankind."
The Outer Space Treaty has governed activities in space since
1967.165 There has been much discussion over whether the geo-
161 U.S. Satellite Companies Unwavering in Opposition to Tongasat, SATELLITE WK.,
Nov. 15, 1993, available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 260991 [hereinafter U.S. Satellite
Companies].
162 FCC to Satellite Industry: You Should Weigh Auction Benefits, SATELLITE NEWS,
May 8, 1995, available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 5914431.
163 Riddick, supra note 3, at 19.
164 ITU Tries to Solve, supra note 149, at *1.
165 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347 (1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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stationary orbit falls in "outer space" and thus comes under the
purview of the Outer Space Treaty.166 Most experts agree, how-
ever, that "outer space" begins at a point approximately 90 to
110 kilometers above the Earth's surface.1 67 The general ap-
proach used to reach this conclusion is to measure the lower
boundary of outer space at the lowest possible perigee (or orbit)
in which a satellite may orbit. Under this test, "one can ... say
that at 96 kilometres one is definitely in outer space ... the 110
kilometre line should satisfy even the most skeptical". 168 The
geostationary orbit, at over 35,000 kilometers up, is therefore
governed by the Outer Space Treaty and the principles it
espouses.
The Treaty consists of seventeen different articles which estab-
lish the broad principles applicable to space activities.169 Arti-
cles I and II are particularly relevant to the issue of the use of
the geostationary orbit. Article I states that "the exploration and
use of Outer Space... shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of eco-
nomic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all
mankind."' ° Article I also specifies that access to outer space
shall be open to all states, and that the exploration and use of
outer space is to be conducted in accordance with international
law.
171
Article II applies the principle of non-appropriation: "Outer
space . . .is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.' 72 Both the principle of space as the "province of all
mankind" and the non-appropriation principle are relevant to
the issue of orbital warehousing: if no one country may lay claim
to any portion of outer space, it follows that a country should
166 See generally S. Mishra and T. Pavlasek, On the Lack of Physical Bases for Defin-
ing a Boundary Between Air Space and Outer Space, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 399
(1982).
167 Finch, supra note 1, at 794.
168 Bin Cheng, The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary Prob-
lem. Functionalism Versus Spatialism: The Major Premises, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
323, 356 (1982).
169 S. Neil Hosenball, Relevant Treaties Governing Space Activities: A Summary of
Worldwide Agreements, 38 FED. B. NEWS &J. 128 (1991).
170 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 165, art. I (emphasis added). The phrase
"interests of all countries" is known as the "common interests" provision of the
Treaty.
171 Id. (emphasis added).
172 Id. art. II (emphasis added).
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not lease out or sell orbital positions. The two concepts of com-
mon interests and non-appropriation are intertwined in that any
claim of sovereignty would be anathema to the principle of the
common interests. The common interest principle, as stated in
article I, however, "has not been regarded as requiring States to
share the benefits in any specific manner, but rather as expres-
sing a desire that the benefits be beneficial in a general
sense."
173
A. THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
In addition to the "common interests" specified in the Outer
Space Treaty, subsequent principles of international law have
evolved which may apply to satellite communications. While the
"province of mankind principle" in the Outer Space Treaty ap-
plies to the geostationary orbit, some experts maintain that
technological and political influences have resulted in relevant
international law and custom more closely resembling the
broader concept of the "common heritage of mankind" as incor-
porated in the Moon Treaty. 174 Although the Moon Treaty does
not specifically apply to the geostationary orbit, the broader
principle has developed in international law to the point where
it may nonetheless have an influence on the allocation of space
resources among all countries.1 75
Where the "province of mankind" principle in the Outer
Space Treaty is simply a "generalized obligation to use the regu-
lated resources for the 'benefit of mankind,"' the common heri-
tage of mankind principle is more specific.1 76 In essence, this
principle is an expansion of the traditional international legal
principle of res communes, by which scarce resources are accessi-
ble to all nations in a regulated manner, but over which no na-
tion may lay claim to sovereignty. 177 The principle "is sometimes
viewed as a revival of the stoic sense of mankind and as the only
17s Stephen Gorove, The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy, 73 AM. J.
INT'L L. 444, 447-48 (1979).
174 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N.
Doc. A/34/664. (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. Very few states have signed
the Moon Treaty. The United States has not. Ezor, supra note 3, at 930.
175 Ezor, supra note 3, at 931.




possible basis for the future organization of human
endeavors."178
The goals underlying the common heritage of mankind prin-
ciple are to protect the physical environment, conserve the
world's resources for present and future generations, and to eq-
uitably allocate benefits of the resource among nations. 79 It
also requires paying particular attention to the needs of the de-
veloping countries, and the presence of an international regime
to pursue these objectives.180 Some contend that the principles
governing satellite communications embody the basic premises
of the common heritage of mankind principle: recognition of a
scarce resource, protection of the resource by minimizing harm-
ful interference, use of frequencies for scientific research and
public safety, efforts to distribute the resource in an equitable
manner, and the existence of an international regime (the ITU)
to govern activities in the geostationary orbit.'8 '
Nonetheless, attempts to extend the narrower principle to the
orbit/spectrum resource specifically have failed, indicating that
most states do not view the principle as the only method of allo-
cating scarce resources.'8 2 Despite the general observance of
the concepts of scarce resources and equitable access which un-
derlie the ITU procedures, "[t]he World Administrative Radio
Conference... has not applied the [common heritage of man-
kind] principle to the [geostationary orbit] and related radio
frequencies, both of which constitute limited natural re-
sources."1 3 Instead, the ITU Convention regulates the resource
through planning and coordination as developed in the 1988
Space WARC.'8 4
Nonetheless, almost every nation has benefited in some way
from the use of outer space, such as gaining access to inexpen-
sive weather information and a general increase in knowledge.
Satellites in particular have provided access to communication
178 Nicolas M. Matte, Limited Aerospace Natural Resources and their Regulation, 7
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 379, 395 (1982).
179 Carl Q. Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agree-
ment Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L
LAw. 429, 451-52 (1980).
180 Id.
181 Rothblatt, supra note 44, at 19.
182 Gennady Danilenko, The Concept of the "Common Heritage of Mankind" in Inter-
national Law, 13 ANNALS SPACE L. 247, 262-63 (1988).
183 Id. at 263.
184 Id. at 262.
1996] 305
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
networks for most of the world.185 Thus, despite a lack of overt
acknowledgement of the applicability of the principle of the
common heritage of mankind to the geostationary orbit, the ac-
tivities of the ITU further the goals underlying the treaty princi-
ples of common interests and benefits for mankind while also
serving the basic premises of the common heritage of mankind
principle. Furthermore, as the common heritage of mankind
principle continues to develop in international law, the regula-
tion of the geostationary orbit may eventually fall under its pur-
view because article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which does
apply to the orbit/spectrum resource, specifies that space activi-
ties (including satellite communications) must be conducted ac-
cording to international law.1 86
B. THE NON-APPROPRIATION PRINCIPLE
Whether satellite communications are governed by the princi-
ples of "common interests" or the "common heritage of man-
kind," the associated principle of non-appropriation does apply
to the orbit/spectrum resource. This principle, established in
article II of the Outer Space Treaty, developed because "appro-
priation by a single State is inconsistent with freedom of use by
all States." 187 Furthermore, the common interests provision of
the Outer Space Treaty is protected by the non-appropriation
principle because the assertion of sovereignty by any one state
over the orbit/spectrum resource (or a portion of it) by defini-
tion would benefit only the appropriating State. 1 8
Acknowledgement of the nearly universal applicability of the
non-appropriation principle can be seen in the response to an
attempt by a group of nations to claim portions of the orbit as
sovereign territory. The claim took form in the Bogota Declara-
tion, in which eight equatorial nations asserted sovereignty over
portions of the geostationary orbit directly over their respective
territories.1 8 9 In the Declaration, the signatory states claimed
185 Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in The Development of Space Law, 13 AN-
NALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 164 (1992).
186 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
187 Smith, supra note 185, at 165.
188 Id.
189 Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3, 1976, re-
printed in SPACE LAw: BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS (Dr. Karl-Herz Bochstiegel & Dr.
Marietta Benko eds., 1990) [hereinafter Bogota Declaration]. The Bogota Decla-
ration was signed by Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya,
Uganda, and Zaire. SMITH, supra note 8, at 211 n.5. By 1988, however, only Co-
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that "segments of [the] geostationary orbit [those over the equa-
tor] are part of the territory over which the Equatorial States
exercise their national sovereignty."19 ° The Declaration lam-
basted the ITU in particular:
In spite of the principle established by article 33... of the Inter-
national Telecommunications Convention, of 1973, that in the
use of frequency bands for space radiocommunications, the
members shall take into account that the frequencies and the
orbit for geostationary satellites are limited natural resources that
must be used efficiently and economically to allow the equitable
access to this orbit and to its frequencies, we can see that both
the geostationary orbit and the frequencies have been used in a
way that does not allow the equitable access of the developing
countries that do not have the technical and financial means that
the great powers have. 91
This viewpoint, however, has been rejected by both the na-
tions that have launched satellites into geostationary orbit and
developing nations which have not yet launched such satel-
lites.192 A claim of sovereignty would be directly antithetical to
the underlying principles of the International Telecommunica-
tions Convention in that granting exclusive rights to the equato-
rial countries would violate the mandate of equitable access.1 93
The claim in the Bogota Declaration is clearly inconsistent with
the underlying justification propounded to support it because
any sovereignty granted over all or part of the geostationary or-
bit would be the opposite result of that required by the princi-
ples of equitable access which the equatorial states used to base
their arguments upon. If ownership is granted, access to the
portions claimed would obviously not be equitable-it would be
foreclosed altogether.
Despite their protestations, it has been questioned whether
the signatories to the Declaration were "serious about gaining
property rights to the geostationary orbit,"194 or were simply ex-
ercising political pressure "on a few developed countries that
[were] monopolizing the geostationary orbit and consequently
restraining the use of the orbit by late-comer developing coun-
lumbia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Kenya maintained the stance in the Bogota Dec-
laration. Bogato Declaration, supra, pt. B.IV.1.
190 Bogota Declaration, supra note 189, pt. B.IV.1, at 2.
191 Id. pt. B.IV.1, at 3.
192 Finch, supra note 1, at 790.
193 SMITH, supra note 8, at 203.
194 Id. at 796.
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tries."19 5 Despite its futility, the Declaration nonetheless did
serve to "assert [the] position [of the equatorial nations] vis a vis
the developed nations."1 96
The overwhelming rejection of the view espoused in the Bo-
gota Declaration firmly validated the principle of non-appropri-
ation of the geostationary orbit and, by extension, the
electromagnetic spectrum. At the same time, however, it fur-
ther illustrated the tension between the developing nations' de-
sire for guaranteed access (despite a lack of technological
capability to utilize the resource) and the position of the admin-
istrations with existing and proposed satellite systems.
Tonga's actions further highlight the problems posed by
these tensions. Because the common heritage principle does
not yet specifically apply to the ITU regulatory framework, and
the non-appropriation principle is firmly entrenched in the re-
gime, thus prohibiting sovereign claims over the orbit, perhaps
Tonga, as a lesser developed nation, determined that the best
way to gain access (despite a lack of satellite capacity of its own)
to the orbit/spectrum resource was to utilize the present system
to acquire its orbital slots. In a sense, Tonga simply played by
the same rules as the established satellite operators to achieve its
goals, much to their apparent chagrin.
C. DOES A MARKET APPROACH VIOLATE THE OUTER SPACE
TREATY AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF SPACE LAW?
Given that Tonga appears not to have violated the letter of
any existing agreements, its subsequent leasing of its allotments
nonetheless brings up the issue of whether a market-based sys-
tem for the orbit/spectrum resource contravenes, at least in
principle, the goals and premises of the Outer Space Treaty for
similar reasons as those pertaining to the ITU Convention.
One suggested approach to this problem would be to vest an
international body such as the ITU with property rights in the
orbit/spectrum resource, with the international community in
general benefitting from market-generated fees. 197 This ap-
proach could actually serve the common interests and the com-
195 Ram Jakhu, The Legal Status of the Geostationay Orbit, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 333, 341 (1982).
196 Finch, supra note 1, at 796.
197 A.M. Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: The ITU in a
Changing World, 13 INT'L LAW. 289, 308 (1979) (quoting BROWN ET AL., REGIMES
FOR THE OCEAN, OUTER SPACE, AND WEATHER 194-95 (1977)).
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mon heritage of mankind principles. 9" The proceeds from
leasing or auctions could be used to redistribute communica-
tions services among the less-developed nations. 199
Despite the common benefits such a system might create,
however, the non-appropriation principle is violated, at least in
spirit, because in essence such a process would create property
rights (albeit in an intergovernmental organization) in the or-
bit/spectrum resource, thus contravening both the concept of
common interests and non-appropriation. ° ° Furthermore, a
system whereby the orbit/spectrum resource or revenues from it
are distributed among the nations of the Earth according to
their respective share of the resource 20 1 would in effect create a
sovereign claim over that portion of the resource designated for
a particular nation.20 2 Such a result is contrary to the non-ap-
propriation principle.
Another problem with a free market approach is that, if an
international authority is charged with apportioning a segment
of the orbit/spectrum resource, setting and collecting fees, and
distributing rents, a politicization of the process could very well
result.20 3 Given the ongoing history of the regulation of tele-
communications, characterized primarily by tensions between
the developed nations and the developing countries, similar po-
litically motivated conflicts would probably arise as the satellite
"haves" and "have nots" vie for the resource. Such ongoing
political tensions would only intensify if the ITU were the au-
thority granted the power to decide who "deserves" orbit and
spectrum or the revenues they generate.
VII. CONCLUSION
The practice of procuring an orbit/spectrum allocation for
the purpose of selling or leasing the positions appears to violate
the spirit and principles of the ITU. It also runs counter to the
basic principles of space law that encompass the geostationary
orbit such as the principle of the "common heritage of man-
kind" in general and those embodied in the Outer Space Treaty
in particular. Given that the present allotment system allows
198 Rutkowski, supra note 197, at 309.
199 Paris Arnopoulos, The International Politics of the Orbit-Spectrum Issue, 7 AN-
NALS AIR & SPACE L. 215, 234 (1982).
200 Stem, supra note 68, at 881.
201 Wihlborg & Wijkman, supra note 160, at 40-41.
202 Stem, supra note 68, at 881.
203 Id.
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this to occur, and the response to Tonga's use of the system to
garner slots for the sole purpose of leasing them, it would seem
that the current regulatory framework is in need of revision. As
discussed previously, many nations and satellite operators agree
and are pressing for changes at the 1997 Conference.
The current a priori system suffers from deficiencies in that
"[t]echnical and operational innovation are unnecessarily im-
paired... [and] [n]ations are induced to seek assignments that
are often far beyond their capability to utilize in the foreseeable
future, to the possible detriment of other nations."20 4 Although
some nations may feel the need to register for more slots than
necessary from fear of losing access due to coordination proce-
dures, "[e]liminating or minimizing the opportunity to acquire
uncommitted resources could help alleviate the current orbital
congestion."20 5 Nonetheless, the concerns expressed by the
lesser developed nations have a solid basis in fact given the pre-
ponderance of satellite systems in use by the developed
nations. 20
6
Any new allotment system must recognize the principles un-
derlying the ITU, the Outer Space Treaty, and other principles
of space law. At the same time, it is necessary that the needs of
the developing nations be addressed and future access guaran-
teed. Thus, any new regime should be predicated "[o] n the ba-
sis of cooperation and the practical accommodation of the
needs which result from the common interest."20 7
The 1997 Conference may yield some answers to these
problems in light of the report currently being prepared for the
conference by the ITU staff.20 8 The task of ensuring equitable
access while guaranteeing the efficient use of the orbit/spec-
trum resource requires a delicate balance of politics, the obser-
vation of relevant international law, the protection of current
users from harmful interference, adaptation to new technology
and above all, maximization of efficiency in order to best utilize
a limited resource. The issue will continue to be a prevalent
topic of discourse in the ITU regime and the satellite industry as
Tonga's (and perhaps others') acquisition of slots in excess of
capacity may "have an affect on who the players are in the satel-
204 Levy, supra note 42, at 197.
205 ITU Tries to Solve, supra note 149, at *1.
206 Smith, supra note 1, at 302.
207 Matte, supra note 178, at 394.




lite arena and with whom they coordinate their efforts."2°9 Fur-
thermore, "[I]arger nations can no longer rest assured that
when they get to space, it will be unclaimed and unoccupied,
because smaller nations may have already arrived and set up
shop."210
209 Ezor, supra note 3, at 941.
210 Id. at 917.
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